are still many gray areas in the history of political and military relations between Italy and Libya. On 31 October, the Libyan Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Shalgam, has further complicated the work of historians and analysts, reviewing the events of war in spring 1986 when the then U.S. President Ronald Reagan gave the order to bomb Tripoli and Benghazi. On the night of 14 April dozen F-111 fighter-bombers deployed in two British bases and aircraft of the Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean, destroyed the military barracks and houses, killing 37 people. The aim of the blitz Use the murder of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who was accused - without proof - to finance international terrorism.
"Warn Colonel!"
"Gaddafi survived - Abdurrahman Shalgam said - because two days before the attack Craxi sent me a friend Italian town to tell me: 'Beware , 14 or 15 April there will be a raid americano contro di voi’. In quell’occasione gli Stati Uniti utilizzarono la base di Lampedusa, ma contro la volontà del governo italiano, perché Roma era contraria all’uso dei cieli e dei mari nazionali per l’aggressione”.
Per il ministro libico, l’Italia faceva il doppio gioco. Nel nome dei comuni interessi (principalmente le forniture petrolifere all’Eni), l’allora presidente del consiglio Bettino Craxi avrebbe chiesto al proprio consigliere diplomatico, l’ambasciatore Antonio Badini, di preavvertire il governo libico delle intenzioni di guerra del partner Nato. Allo stesso tempo Palazzo Chigi sosteneva l’intervento “anti-terrorismo” di Washington. A balancing on a knife edge. While it is true, in fact, that during the attack of the U.S. April 14, 1986 Italy did not authorize the U.S. bombers to fly over national airspace, aircraft refueling tankers for the F-111 departed from a U.S. base in Italy (probably Sigonella), while all ports and military technical stops in Sicily are home to the naval units of the Sixth Fleet, on the eve and after the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi.
"that attack the American initiative was improper, a failure of an international character," said Giulio Andreotti, while Foreign Minister Craxi government. "And I just che dall’Italia partì un avvertimento per la Libia”, ha aggiunto il senatore a vita, confermando le “rivelazioni” libiche. Ancora più esplicita la vecchia guardia del partito socialista italiano. “Gheddafi salvato da Craxi?”, ha dichiarato Gianni De Michelis, più volte alla guida della Farnesina e ministro del lavoro nei giorni del conflitto Usa-Libia. “Si sapeva da tempo che i rapporti tra Roma e Tripoli erano più che buoni. Se c’è un filo conduttore tra la Prima e la Seconda Repubblica è senza dubbio il rapporto tra Roma e Tripoli. Da Andreotti a Craxi fino a Berlusconi, Prodi e D’Alema, si è sempre mantenuto saldo il rapporto. La Libia è quasi parte d’Italia and we have never done mystery of our ideas and our contacts with the Libyans (...) Craxi had warn the Libyan government and the Americans after they tried hooks, so much so that eventually was settled for the massacre of Lockerbee ". Even the then foreign manager of the PSI, Margherita Boniver, has confirmed the 'help' to Craxi: "The military operation was not shared and therefore the Italian government warned Gaddafi. And used all means at its disposal ...".
The historical reappraisal of the events had already begun, always at home 's (ex) carnation, during the campaign beatification of the late socialist leader. "Craxi was to inform the forthcoming blitz American Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, allowing to save," says Cesare Marini in 2003, Senator Sdi. It was thus not a scoop to Abdurrahman Shalgam. The dual-channel diplomacy was known for some time.
War Games in the Mediterranean
why the statements by the Libyan representative of the executive have produced serious concerns and some resentment among some of the political players that in two years 1985-86 opposed the war campaign in the Mediterranean, also denounced the oppressive militarization process that resulted in Sicily. The exponents of the then strong anti-war movement Sicilian remember that Italy was in the front line against Libya next to Washington and that their Craxi and the entire Socialist Party were among the most vocal detractors of peace, all accused of being operated and funded by Gaddafi. Mr. Augustine Spataro, a former Communist Party member of Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of the House of Representatives, recalled on April that despite the 'warning', died under U.S. bombs the adoptive daughter of three years of the Libyan colonel. " In reality - explains the former MP - what happened that night has long been feared, and it was known, or that the Reagan administration had already planned the attack on Libya. "
Spataro adds that following the attack, April 15, 1986, Libya responded with the launch of two Scud missiles against the U.S. Loran Station Coast Guard hosted the island of Lampedusa. " Gaddafi, infuriated by the cowardly, indiscriminate attack, the retaliation is not directed to one of many possible U.S. targets, but threw missiles against Italy or against the land-friend whose head of government had warned imminent danger. But those two missiles, left the Libyan soil and above actually reached Lampedusa? Even then, doubts surfaced, both for the low efficiency and potential of technology for both military and Libyan fact, not secondary, that Lampedusa did not notice the arrival of two powerful bombs. Today it is still unknown the exact impact . No one is able to demonstrate that the two missiles have arrived in Lampedusa and / or in its immediate vicinity. " For the Socialist
Cesare Marini this was mere "fiction": the launching of missiles at Lampedusa was just a gimmick depistante, "used per coprire l’amico italiano” d’avanti agli Stati Uniti. “Di certo io non mi sono spaventato”, ha dichiarato l’immancabile Giulio Andreotti. “La mia sensazione è che i missili furono lanciati ma volutamente fuori bersaglio: non c’era nessuna volontà di causarci dei danni”. Una vera e propria fiction di guerra, dunque.
Il pomeriggio del 15 aprile 1986, gli abitanti di Lampedusa avvertirono due boati a largo dell’isola. Il primo dispaccio di agenzia parlò di “cannonate sparate da una motovedetta libica”. Qualche minuto dopo si parlò del “Bang” dovuto al passaggio a bassa quota di aerei supersonici. Intorno alle 18 U.S. authorities informed the Italian Minister of Defence, John Spadolini, launching two missiles against the island. But the bombs were dropped in a couple of miles from the coast. The next day, the Libyan ambassador in Rome confirmed the attack: "The missiles came from Libya. But we did not try to hit Italy, but a U.S. base. "
Two missiles were lost in the void
But what really happened that day? What makes it more murky contours of the story we thought the former general, Basil Cottone, a Sicilian native del comune di Raccuia (Messina), capo di stato maggiore dell’Aeronautica militare dal 1983 al 1986. In un’intervista al quotidiano Pagine di Difesa del 20 settembre 2005, Cottone, si è detto scettico del lancio dei missili libici. “Sono stato responsabile dell’approntamento della reazione italiana al lancio dei missili su Lampedusa”, ha esordito l’ex militare. “Personalmente non ho mai creduto che siano stati lanciati missili da parte libica contro il territorio italiano. Ma, poiché allora tutti lo credevano, ho ritenuto di operare di conserva. La notizia del lancio dei missili per me era falsa e le azioni messe in atto volevano accreditarla. Molte organizzazioni extranazionali erano allora interested in the fact that the Italian government adopted a policy of closing stronger against Libya. Keep in mind that in the '70s and early '80s, the terrorist attacks against Western targets were numerous. These include: hijacking of passenger aircraft, commercial aircraft slaughter, massacre at the '72 Olympics in Monaco and the late Fiumicino attack in '73. In this context, the mission to Libya is part of Argos-16 with which they were brought within the Palestinian terrorists arrested at Heathrow while preparing an attack on an Israeli commercial airliner. These and other subsequent events, led to a tightening policy by the West to Libya Gaddafi ". Basil Cotton argues that "someone" tried to create the conditions for crack irreparably relations Rome-Tripoli. "From here the news of the missiles on the road Lampedusa was brief. I think, was an action of 'services' that have installed the thing, though the fact has taken on international credibility and has remained in the collective launch concrete. "
The words of the former chief of staff, was followed by those of General Mario Arpino, Cottone's successor at the helm of the Air. In an interview with L'Espresso (November 25, 2005), Arpino has admitted che le forze armate non raccolsero mai nessuna prova evidente dell’attacco missilistico. “I nostri radar non erano in grado di scoprire missili di quel genere”, ha aggiunto il generale. “Avevamo chiesto alla Nato di fornirci degli Awacs, radar volanti molto potenti, ma ci furono concessi mesi dopo. Io ero responsabile della sala di crisi e gli americani non mi comunicarono nulla. Se informavano qualcuno, lo facevano a livello politico. So con certezza che non venimmo nemmeno avvisati del raid contro Tripoli. Ricordo la sorpresa quella notte quando i nostri radar scoprirono gli aerei diretti in Libia”.
Prima della nomina ai massimi vertici dell’AMI, Basilio Cottone era stato comandante della 5° Ataf di Vicenza, la forza aerotattica della Nato, e successivamente rappresentante militare italiano presso il Comitato dell’Alleanza Atlantica di Bruxelles. Dimessosi dalle Forze Armate, l’alto ufficiale fu nominato, il 14 aprile 1993, presidente del consiglio d’amministrazione dell’Agusta Spa, società leader nella produzione di elicotteri da guerra. Ai vertici dell’industria di elicotteri, Cottone ci resterà ininterrottamente per sette anni, per poi divenirne consigliere. L’ingresso del generale in Agusta avvenne quattordici giorni prima della caduta del primo governo di Giuliano Amato (Psi), ministro della difesa il siciliano Salvo Andò (Psi) e sottosegretari due potenti politici della provincia di Messina, Salvatore D'Alia (Dc) and Dino Madaudo (PSDI). The appointment of General Cottone was adopted by Commissioner of EFIM liquidator, Alberto Predieri, after the arrest of manager Roberto D'Alessandro, former president Agusta - then acquitted - in the investigation on bribery in favor of Socialist Party to supply 12 helicopters to the Civil Defence (Minister, then, Nicola Capria, PSI and also Messina).
The September 1, 1993, another investigation, "Arzente Island, Agusta would involve a transaction with respect to weapons run by some busybody Messina on routes Italy-Netherlands Antilles, Peru and Syria. Specifically, in the spring of 1992 was initiated negotiations for the transfer of twelve CH47 helicopters "Agusta" at the National Guard of Saudi Arabia. Among the brokers of the deal, the notorious arms dealer Adnan Kashoggi Arab entrepreneurs and today's close entourage Italian prime. Eventually, however, the judicial inquiry ran aground in the quicksand of Attorney Messina.
Weapons and cement to the North African partner
The Agusta, AgustaWestland today, with Eni is one of the first Italian returned to work in Libya after the Rome-Tripoli rapprochement. In January 2006 have been delivered to the Libyan armed forces, 10 A109 Power helicopters, a value of € 80 million, intended to "border control". The Italian company has also signed an agreement with the Libyan Company for Aviation Industry to form a joint venture (the Libyan Italian Advanced Technology Company - Liatec) for the development of activities in aeronautics and security systems. The following year it was the turn of Finmeccanica, the holding company that has control of AgustaWestland, to sign an agreement with the Libyan government for the creation of a joint venture in the field of electronics and telecommunications systems on defense, with the Libyan market and target the African continent. In January 2008, Alenia Aeronautica, a Finmeccanica other company, has signed with the Libyan Ministry of the Interior a contract worth over € 31 million for the provision of maritime patrol aircraft ATR-42MP "Surveyor".
Italian war industry anxiously awaits the ratification of the Treaty of Cooperation between Italy and Libya signed by Silvio Berlusconi and Colonel Gaddafi. Article 20 of the Treaty provides for "a strong and broad industry partnership in the field of defense and military industries, as well as the development of" collaboration in the field of defense between their armed forces, through the exchange of expert missions and the accomplishment of joint maneuvers (although since 2001 the navies of Italy and Libya carry out annual exercise "Nauras" in the Sicilian Channel ). The two countries also undertake to define "initiatives, both bilateral and regional level in order to prevent illegal immigration in their countries of origin of migrants."
It was no coincidence that the statements by the Minister Shalgam on pre-warning of U.S. bombing in 1986 have coincided with a conference organized in Rome from the foundation Beppe Pisanu led by former minister, Giulio Andreotti present, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, the eldest son of Libyan leader, Saif al-Islam, and the elite of Italian (Eni, Enel, Telecom, Unicredit, Trenitalia, BNL , Fondiaria-Sai, Impregilo, etc.).. On site works are "compensatory" of the Italian colonial crimes to $ 5 billion to be implemented in Libya in the next 20 years. The Italo-Libyan Cooperation Treaty expressly provides that Italian companies are to realize infrastructure projects.
Meanwhile the Libyan capital is buying up stakes of the major Italian companies. Acquired 4.9% of Unicredit, the Central Bank of Libya would be to detect a proportion between 1 and 2% of Terna, the company that operates the national grid. The Libyans WOULD BE well to enter in Impregilo, the giant Italian construction, general contractor for the construction of the bridge over the Straits of Messina, the Moses of Venice and major sections of the TAV station. The Libyans will aim to buy about 5% of the capital, also getting a seat on the board of directors of Impregilo. In Libya, for that matter, the Italian group has formed a few months ago a joint venture to build three universities in the cities of Misuratah, and Tarhunah Zliten (contract value, 400 million euro).
Al convegno di Roma del 31 ottobre, l’amministratore delegato d’Impregilo, Massimo Ponzellini, è comparso accanto a Saif El-Islam. Cresciuto all’ombra dell’ex presidente del consiglio Romano Prodi, dopo aver ricoperto l’incarico di direttore generale del centro studi Nomisma e dirigente superiore dell’IRI, Massimo Ponzellini passò a sedere nel consiglio d’amministrazione di Finmeccanica. Amministratore delegato della holding di controllo del complesso militare industriale italiano è stato pure Alberto Lina, amministratore delegato d’Impregilo sino al 2007.
Armi e cemento segnano la strategia di penetrazione in nord Africa del capitale finanziario nostrano. “Italiani? Good people .... "
Article published on November 5, 2008 Agoravox.it
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